Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108360 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2014/30
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
The dependence of benefit on the retirement age (the schedule) is an important feature in any public pension system. The nonfinancial defined contribution (NDC) pension system has recently become popular mainly because of its allegedly actuarial fairness. Using the framework of mechanism design with adverse selection, these systems have theoretically been criticized because they neglect the resulting regressive intracohort redistribution: longer lived workers retire later and are rewarded as if their life expectancies were average. We document such adverse selection on Hungarian data. The resulting redistribution can be diminished but not eliminated. Giving up mechanism design, we corroborate our earlier qualitative findings in a more realistic framework.
Schlagwörter: 
nonfinancial defined contributions
variable retirement
adverse selection
actuarial fairness
JEL: 
C61
C63
D82
D91
H55
ISBN: 
978-615-5447-49-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
225.58 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.