Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108328
Authors: 
Kinateder, Markus
Kiss, Hubert János
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2013/45
Abstract: 
We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation (JPE, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information.
Subjects: 
Bank Run
Imperfect Information
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
D82
G21
ISBN: 
978-615-5447-06-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
746.82 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.