Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108319
Authors: 
Simonovits, András
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2013/24
Abstract: 
A general framework is analyzed which contains several special transfer (tax and pension) models. In our static two-overlapping-generation framework, every individual works in the first stage of the adult age, while is retired in the second. The government operates a balanced linear transfer system, sometimes with caps. In the models, the individuals may optimize their situation in various ways: contributing to voluntary pension, restraining labor supply and underreporting wages. Individuals are typically short-sighted, therefore they choose paternalistically suboptimal decisions. The models provide useful information on the socially optimal paternalistic transfer system.
Subjects: 
tax systems
pension systems
pension models
overlapping generations
paternalism
JEL: 
H24
I31
J22
J26
ISBN: 
978-615-5243-81-3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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