Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108281
Authors: 
Habis, Helga
Csercsik, Dávid
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2012/29
Abstract: 
We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. we allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classicakl core concept, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A prominent application, a game of consumers and generators on an electrical energy transmission network is examined in details, where the power in- and outlets of the nodes have to be determined in a way, that if any line instantaneously fails, none of the remaining lines may be overloaded. We show that fulfilling this safety requirement in a mutually acceptable way can be achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core.
Subjects: 
partition function form games
uncertainty
core
sustainability
JEL: 
C71
C73
D62
L14
L94
ISBN: 
978-615-5243-32-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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