Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108253 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2012/5
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest
Abstract: 
We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games.We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core.
Subjects: 
transferable utility games
uncertainty
weak sequential core
bankruptcy games
JEL: 
C71
C73
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-97-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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