Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108251
Authors: 
Méder, Zsombor Z.
Simonovits, András
Vincze, János
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2012/3
Abstract: 
We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffer-curves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.
Subjects: 
tax evasion
tax morale
agent-based simulation
JEL: 
H26
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-94-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
260.98 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.