Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108241 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2011/37
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the impact of (exogenous) tax morale on the optimal design of progressive income taxation. In our model, only universal basic income (transfer) is financed from a linear income tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor disutility and tax morale, respectively. Limiting the utilitarianism to the poorer parts of the population (defined by the welfare share), the optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the welfare share.
Schlagwörter: 
tax morale
progressive income tax
undeclared earning
labor supply
income redistribution
JEL: 
H21
H26
H41
D58
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-76-4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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