Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108239 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2011/39
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists.
Schlagwörter: 
matching
couples
stability
computational complexity
incentive compatibility
restricted domains
large markets
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-80-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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