Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108239
Authors: 
Biró, Péter
Klijn, Flip
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2011/39
Abstract: 
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists.
Subjects: 
matching
couples
stability
computational complexity
incentive compatibility
restricted domains
large markets
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-80-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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