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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2011/20
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex.
Schlagwörter: 
transferable utility games
uncertainty
Weak Sequential Core
JEL: 
C71
C73
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-56-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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