Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108223
Authors: 
Habis, Helga
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2011/19
Abstract: 
We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities. Even when markets are strongly complete, the Classical Core is argued not to be an appropriate concept. For the general case of incomplete markets, the Weak Sequential Core is the only concept that does not suffer from major defects.
Subjects: 
Incomplete Markets
Dynamic Core Concepts
Time and uncertainty
JEL: 
C71
C73
D52
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-55-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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