Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108216
Authors: 
Garay, Barnabás M.
Simonovits, András
Tóth, János
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2011/4
Abstract: 
We study a model of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax only finances the provision of public goods. Deciding on reported income, each individual takes into account that the less he reports, the higher is his private consumption but the lower is his moral satisfaction. The latter depends on his own current report and average previous reports of his neighbors. Under quite general assumptions, the steady state reported income is symmetric and the process converges to the steady state.
Subjects: 
tax evasion
steady state
asymptotic stability
symmetrization
networks
monotone maps
JEL: 
C62
H26
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-34-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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