Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108202
Authors: 
Kóczy, László Á.
Pintér, Péter Miklós
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2010/25
Abstract (Translated): 
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We illustrate the use of this model on examples from Hungary.
Subjects: 
weighted voting
Hungarian National Assembly
absent voters
Shapley-Shubik index
JEL: 
C71
D72
ISBN: 
978-615-5024-16-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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