Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108128
Authors: 
Kóczy, László Á.
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2008/20
Abstract: 
While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the in-dices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.
Subjects: 
Banzhaf index
Shapley-Shubik index
a priori voting power
rational players
JEL: 
C71
D72
ISBN: 
978-963-9796-38-6
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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