Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108126 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2008/5
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the interconnections of underreported earnings, savings and oldage pension with the help of a most simple, elementary model. The workers can be divided into three groups: 1) well-paid who report their full earnings, 2) well-paid who report only the minimum earnings (evaders) and 3) the poorly paid. We assume that the evaders save a significant part of their hidden earnings for their old age. We compare three pension systems of equal size: (i) the proportional, (ii) the proportional plus basic pension and (iii) the proportional with means testing. Our major result is as follows: if the evaders can be recognized and excluded, then the means-tested system is superior to the basic system.
Schlagwörter: 
reporting earnings
proportional pensions
basic pensions
meansassisted pensions
JEL: 
H55
D91
ISBN: 
978-963-9796-17-1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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