Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108099
Authors: 
Major, Iván
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2006/3
Abstract: 
Credit bureaus administering information sharing among lenders about customers reduce information asymmetry and should be key to modern credit markets. In contrast to former studies, we show that willingness to share information depends more on institutions and market concentration than on demand or other market characteristics such as, regional diversity or local monopolies. We show using infinite period models with strategic behavior that lenders' interest to share information depends on market concentration and the type of information sharing arrangement. Sharing bad information only is the dominant strategy if banks think long-term. If banks are myopic no information sharing may occur.
Subjects: 
Organisational Behaviour
Transaction Costs
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information
Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth
Investment
or Financing
Banks
Other Depository Institutions
Mortgages
JEL: 
D23
D81
D82
D92
G21
ISBN: 
9639588725
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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