Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108068
Authors: 
Bognar, Kata
Smith, Lones
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2004/15
Abstract: 
We analyze time-costly decision-making in committees by privately informed individuals, such as juries, panels, boards, etc. In the spirit of the Coase Conjecture, we show that the decision is "almost instantaneous" when individuals entertain identical objectives. Delay can only be understood as the outcome of conflicting (biased) objectives.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
319.85 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.