Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/108068 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2004/15
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
We analyze time-costly decision-making in committees by privately informed individuals, such as juries, panels, boards, etc. In the spirit of the Coase Conjecture, we show that the decision is "almost instantaneous" when individuals entertain identical objectives. Delay can only be understood as the outcome of conflicting (biased) objectives.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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