Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108061
Authors: 
Koczy, Laszlo A.
Lauwers, Luc
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2004/21
Abstract: 
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.
Subjects: 
dynamic solution
absorbing set
core
non-emptiness
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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