Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108027
Authors: 
Ambrus-Lakatos, Lorand
Meszerics, Tamas
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2001/9
Abstract: 
This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our thesis by perturbing the Ultimatum Game in a way that emphasizes the force of self-interest considerations; the evidence we collected provides support for our thesis.
JEL: 
C72
C78
C91
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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