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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2014-069
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper derives restrictions on monetary and fiscal policies for determinate equilibria in a two-country monetary union with autarkic members. It finds that a central bank following the Taylor principle may not be sufficient for determinacy unless accompanied by one 'active' fiscal authority in the sense of Leeper (1991). Alternatively, both fiscal authorities can be 'active' while the central bank abandons the Taylor principle. The two determinate equilibria have significantly different implications for the transmission of fiscal and monetary shocks and for the fiscal theory of the price level in a monetary union.
Schlagwörter: 
fiscal theory
monetary union
policy coordination
indeterminacy
JEL: 
E31
E52
E62
E63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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