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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 15-010/II
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions are necessary for SSPE but insufficient because these equations can be singular. Strategy profiles excluding perpetual disagreement guarantee non-singularity. The necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of stationary best responses additionally require either an equalizing condition or a minimality condition. Quasi SSPE only satisfy the recursive equations and optimality conditions. These always exist and are SSPE if either all equalizing conditions or all minimality conditions hold.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining
existence
one-stage-deviation principle
dynamic programming
recursive equations
Markov Decision Theory
JEL: 
C72
C73
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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