Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107870
Authors: 
Ansink, Erik
Gengenbach, Michael
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-001/VIII
Abstract: 
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water while other agents can take some of the river water that passes their territory.
Subjects: 
river sharing
water trade
market emergence
property rights
coalition stability
JEL: 
D62
C72
Q25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
171.18 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.