Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107843
Authors: 
Ansink, Erik
Houba, Harold
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 14-132/VIII
Abstract: 
We survey the economics of transboundary river water allocation, which emerged in the 1960s and has matured over the last decade due to increasing concerns over water scarcity and pollution. We outline the major approaches and pay specific attention to the strategic aspects of transboundary river water allocation. These strategic aspects are captured by employing game theory to assess the economics of transboundary river water allocation in a simple model of river sharing. This model allows us to show how conflict and cooperation over transboundary water resources may occur. It also allows us to pay specific attention to the efficiency, sustainability, and fairness of solutions to this model. We compare and contrast both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches and we relate their solutions to illustrative examples.
Subjects: 
River sharing problem
River claims problem
Fairness
Efficiency
Sustainability
Water allocation agreement
Bargaining
Water trade
Sharing rules
Axiomatic approach
JEL: 
C71
C73
D63
D74
F53
Q25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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