Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107822 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 14-112/II
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a stochastic dynamic game of process innovation in which firms can initiate and terminate R&D efforts and production at different times. We discern the impact of knowledge spillovers on the investments in existing markets, as well as on the likely structure of newly forming markets, for all possible asymmetries between firms. We show that the relation between spillovers, R&D efforts, and surpluses is non-monotonic and dependent on both the relative and absolute efficiency of firms. Larger spillovers increase the likelihood that a new technology is brought to production, but they do not necessarily make the industry more competitive.
Schlagwörter: 
Differential game
Feedback Nash equilibrium
Numerical partial differential equations
R&D
Spillovers
JEL: 
C61
C63
C73
D43
D92
L13
O31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
3.82 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.