Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107769 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 89
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Since the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates has on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer.
Schlagwörter: 
tax havens
tax information exchange agreements
location decisions
international taxation
JEL: 
F21
F23
H87
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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