Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107597
Authors: 
Cagala, Tobias
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Grimm, Veronika
Rincke, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Public Goods E03-V3 (Revised Version: February 2015)
Abstract: 
Public goods provision often involves groups of contributors repeatedly interacting with administrators who can extract rents from the pool of contributions. We suggest a novel identification approach that exploits the sequential ordering of decisions in a panel vector autoregressive model to study social interactions in the laboratory. Despite rent extraction, contributors and administrators establish a stable interaction with cooperation matching the level from a comparable Public Goods Game. In the short run, temporary changes in behavior trigger substantial behavioral multiplier effects. We demonstrate that cooperation breeds trustworthiness and vice versa and that one-time disruptions are particularly damaging in settings with a lack of cooperative attitudes and trust.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
trustworthiness
rent extraction
methods for laboratory experiments
panel vector autoregressive model
JEL: 
C32
C91
C92
H41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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