Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107543
Authors: 
Grund, Christian
Harbring, Christine
Thommes, Kirsten
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8761
Abstract: 
In organizations, some team members are assigned to a team for a predefined short period of time, e.g., as they have a temporary contract, while others are permanent members of the same team. In a laboratory experiment we analyze the cooperation levels resulting from diverse teams, where some team members remain with a team and others are switching teams. Our results reveal that teams consisting partly of members with temporary membership display a lower productivity compared to teams of permanent team members only. First, temporary team members cooperate less than permanent team members. Second, individual effort decisions increase with the number of team mates who are of the same type. This second effect holds for both temps and permanents. We argue that social identity is affected by team composition and the individuals' role in a team.
Subjects: 
cooperation
economic experiment
public good
team
JEL: 
C9
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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