Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107514
Authors: 
Doepke, Matthias
Kindermann, Fabian
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8726
Abstract: 
The economic theory of fertility choice builds predominantly on the unitary model of the household, in which there is a single household utility function and potential intra-household disagreement is abstracted from. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that many (potential) mothers and fathers disagree on whether to have children, on how many children to have, and on when to have them. In this paper, we review existing work that brings models of intrahousehold conflict and bargaining to bear on fertility choice, and we point out promising future directions for this line of research.
Subjects: 
fertility
bargaining
child care
limited commitment
JEL: 
D13
J12
J13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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