Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107513
Authors: 
Kritikos, Alexander S.
Tan, Jonathan H. W.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8739
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally investigates the nature of image concerns in gift giving. For this, we test variants of dictator and impunity games where the influences of social preferences on behavior are kept constant across all games. Givers maximize material payoffs by pretending to be fair when receivers do not know the actual surplus size, implying that portraying an outward appearance of norm compliance matters more than actual compliance. In impunity games, receivers can reject gifts with no payoff consequence to givers. In the face of receivers' feedback, some givers ensure positive feedback by donating more while some avoid negative feedback by not giving at all. Removing feedback reduces the incentive to give altogether. Differing behavior in the four games implies that social confirmation plays a crucial role in the transmission of image concerns in giving.
Subjects: 
dictator game
impunity game
experiment
image
social confirmation
JEL: 
C78
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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