Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107443
Authors: 
Erlei, Mathias
Siemer, J. Philipp
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
TUC Working Papers in Economics 02
Abstract: 
In a hold-up experiment designed to test theoretical predictions following from Hart (1995) and deMeza/Lockwood (1998) regarding investment behavior Sonnemans et al. (2001) (SOS) find only a partial confirmation of theory. According to SOS these deviations from standard theory can be explained by positive reciprocal behavior. In this paper, we replicate the experiment by SOS and add another group of treatments in which asset ownership is endogenized by auctioning off the assets. Our experiment shows that the results by SOS crucially depend on the ownership structure being exogenously assigned by the experimenter. We present experimental evidence that, by and large, corroborates the theoretical predictions made by Hart (1995).
Subjects: 
property rights
hold-up
experiment
endogenous ownership structure
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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