Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107341
Authors: 
Siegmeier, Jan
Mattauch, Linus
Edenhofer, Ottmar
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5161
Abstract: 
Carbon pricing regulates emission flows and collects rents from underlying fossil resource stocks. The resulting investment shift implies lower climate policy costs and improved welfare if capital is underaccumulated. We prove that under emission trading, such a beneficial macroeconomic portfolio effect between fossil stocks and capital is induced if some permits are auctioned. Alternatively, a carbon tax also induces a portfolio effect, but cannot simultaneously implement a given mitigation path and collect an arbitrary rent share. Finally, treating the right to recurrently receive a share of total emission permits as a tradable asset is formally, but not politically equivalent.
Subjects: 
carbon pricing
resource rent taxation
overlapping generations
capital underaccumulation
JEL: 
E22
H21
H23
Q30
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.