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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5141
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Justification for policies to encourage investments in education, particularly for individuals at the lower end of the ability distribution, may be provided by behavioural economics. We present a prototypical model where individuals who are potentially loss averse around their expected outcome make risky investments in education and we draw on optimal tax theory to explore the design of policy. The model highlights the critical roles played by (i) the relationship between behavioural risk preferences, standard risk aversion and labour supply behaviour, (ii) the risk properties of education, and (iii) the degree of observability of individual academic ability.
Schlagwörter: 
education
risk
disappointment
optimal taxation
JEL: 
D81
H21
I21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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