Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107306
Authors: 
Di Maria, Corrado
Lange, Ian A.
Lazarova, Emiliya
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5124
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically how upstream markets are affected by deregulation downstream. Deregulation tends to increase the level of uncertainty in the upstream market. Our theoretical analysis predicts that deregulated firms respond to this increase in uncertainty by writing more rigid contracts with their suppliers. Using the restructuring of the electricity market in the U.S. as our case study, we find support for our theoretical predictions. Furthermore, we investigate the impact this change in procurement contracts has on efficiency. Focusing on coal mines, we find that those selling coal to plants in restructured markets are significantly more productive than their counterparts working with regulated plants. On the other hand, we also find that transaction costs may have increased as a consequence of deregulation.
Subjects: 
energy policy
electricity market restructuring
deregulation
procurement contracts
risk
efficiency
JEL: 
L14
L51
Q31
Q48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.