Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107213
Authors: 
Vetter, Henrik
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 2015-5 [Pages:] 1-20
Abstract: 
The author analyses delegation in homogenous duopoly under the assumption that firm-managers compete in supply functions. He reverses earlier findings in that owners give managers incentives to act in an accommodating way. That is, optimal delegation reduces per-firm output and increases profits to above-Cournot profits. Moreover, in supply function equilibrium, the mode of competition is endogenous. This means that the author avoids results that are sensitive with respect to assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition.
Subjects: 
Delegation
incentives
supply function equilibrium
JEL: 
D22
D43
L22
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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