Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107131
Authors: 
Duffy, John
Fehr, Dietmar
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2015-202
Abstract: 
We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game forms. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game despite the possibility of efficient play in the latter game. Similarly, a precedent of inefficient play in the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games has little to do with historical precedents and is mainly determined by strategic considerations associated with the different payouts of these similar repeated games.
Subjects: 
Equilibrium Selection
Precedent
Beliefs
Stag Hunt
Prisoner's Dilemma
Repeated Games
Experimental Economics
JEL: 
C72
C73
C92
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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