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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2015/3
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Mechanism design theory strongly relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. However, studies of experimental games show that Nash equilibria are rarely played and that subjects may be thinking only a finite number of iterations. We study one of the most influential benchmarks of mechanism design theory, the expected externality mechanism (DÁspremont, Gerard-Varet, 1979) in a finite-depth environment described by the Lk model. While efficient implementation fails under certain conditions, our results provide a vindication of the mechanism in the convex quasi-linear environment with finitely-rational agents.
Schlagwörter: 
bounded rationality
expected externality
externality mechanisms
Level-K
JEL: 
D71
D82
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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