Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/106674
Authors: 
Kübler, Dorothea
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Wirtschaftsdienst [ISSN:] 1613-978X [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Volume:] 92 [Year:] 2012 [Issue:] 12 [Pages:] 843-847
Abstract: 
Nicht alle Güter werden über einen Preismechanismus auf Märkten gehandelt. Angebot und Nachfrage von Plätzen an Schulen und Universitäten, die Zuweisung von Organen bei Lebendspendern und die Partnerwahl vollziehen sich nach anderen Regeln. Wie diese Regeln gestaltet sein müssen, um zu effizienten Vermittlungsergebnissen zu kommen, und wann eine stabile Allokation auf diesen Märkten möglich ist, haben die beiden Nobelpreisträger untersucht.
Abstract (Translated): 
The Nobel prize in economics in 2012 was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth for 'the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design' (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences). The prize honours Lloyd Shapley's theoretical foundations of the theory of stable allocations (in particular the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm) as well as the theoretical and practical contributions to the design of matching markets by Al Roth. As prices do not play their usual role in equating supply and demand, market failure is widespread (congestion, unravelling, lack of thickness). The actual design of two-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical investigations of the market and its rules.
JEL: 
A11
C78
D47
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
151.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.