Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/106622
Authors: 
Polishchuk, Leonid
Syunyaevy, Georgiy
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IOS Working Papers 343
Abstract: 
We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites´ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites´ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.
Subjects: 
endogenous property rights
credible commitment
“stationary bandit”
JEL: 
K11
O17
P14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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