Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/106471
Authors: 
Teichmann, Isabel
von Schlippenbach, Vanessa
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 1440
Abstract: 
A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further if the upstream firm chooses a mixed distribution system in which it makes use of an intermediary to distribute the good to a subset of the retailers and delivers directly only to the remaining downstream firms.
Subjects: 
Vertical relations
Delegation
Downstream Monopolization
Commitment problem
Channel structure
Multi-tier industry
JEL: 
L12
L14
L42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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