Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105788
Authors: 
Lombardi, Michele
Yoshihara, Naoki
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics 2014-09
Abstract: 
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty. Secondly, the class of efficient allocation rules that are implementable is identified provided that at least one agent has strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly, the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.
Subjects: 
Natural implementation
Nash equilibrium
exchange economies
intrinsic preferences for honesty
JEL: 
C72
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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