Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105732
Authors: 
Holler, Manfred
Skott, Peter
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics 2004-12
Abstract: 
Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinant of election outcomes. This paper uses a two-party setting and simple game theoretic models to analyse the strategic interaction between the partiesÂ’ campaign decisions. Alternations of power emerge naturally, even if both electoral preferences and party positions remain constant.
Subjects: 
Election
campaign platforms
agenda setting
cost of ruling
Condorcet
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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