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Autoren: 
Skott, Peter
Auerbach, Paul
Datum: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2004-03
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a simple model with two levels of skill, we assume that high-skill workers who fail to get high-skill jobs may accept low-skill positions; low-skill workers do not have the analogous option of filling high-skill positions. This asymmetry implies that an adverse, skill-neutral shock to aggregate employment may cause an increase in wage inequality, both between and within skill categories, as well as an increase in unemployment, especially among low-skill workers. Movements in productivity, unemployment and inequality may thus be linked to induced overeducation and credentialism.
Schlagwörter: 
wage inequality
unemployment
skill-bias
overeducation
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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