Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105712
Authors: 
Gosling, Amanda
Satchi, Mathan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers 1401
Abstract: 
We present a job posting model of a labour market where jobs differ in characteristics other than wages and workers differ in their marginal willingness to pay for such characteristics. This creates incentives for firms to separate workers by posting multiple jobs. The interaction between these separation incentives and the standard search frictions is the key contribution of the paper. The paper examines the implications for policies such as a minimum wage or ones which set minimum standards on these non-wage job characteristics. We show that policies that set standards on wages and the other job characteristics can increase the utility of the worst-off workers and may reduce inefficient forms of unemployment. Policies that only intervene in one aspect on the other hand may increase these forms of unemployment.
Subjects: 
Search
Job posting
Non-wage characteristics
Separation incentives
Minimum Wages
JEL: 
J31
J32
J42
J64
J80
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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