Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105706
Authors: 
Cartwright, Edward J.
Lovett, Denise
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers 1324
Abstract: 
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal return to the public good and type of game. The marginal return is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The 'standard' game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. We find no strong evidence that the marginal return or type of game makes a difference to the extent of conditional cooperation. We also find no evidence that the type of game makes a difference to unconditional contributions. The level of marginal return does, however, have a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role that can be played by leaders in a public good game.
Subjects: 
Public good
conditional cooperation
reciprocity
leadership
JEL: 
C72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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