Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/105549 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 1119
Verlag: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
This study examines the relationship between bargaining power and the use of contraceptives in the household. Using data from rural Bangladesh in 1998-1999 it investigates whether women in a relatively strong bargaining position at the time of marriage continue to remain in a strong position post marriage as seen by their decision to use the contraceptive pill. Empirical results from multinomial logit provide evidence for this showing that as brideprice, taken as a fraction of total household marriage payment, increases from 0.1 to 0.3 the predicted probability of the mother using the contraceptive pill increases by 8 percentage points.
Schlagwörter: 
marriage market
marriage payments
female bargaining power
contraceptive use
rural Bangladesh
JEL: 
J12
J13
J16
D10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.2 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.