Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105549
Authors: 
Mansoor, Nazia
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers 1119
Abstract: 
This study examines the relationship between bargaining power and the use of contraceptives in the household. Using data from rural Bangladesh in 1998-1999 it investigates whether women in a relatively strong bargaining position at the time of marriage continue to remain in a strong position post marriage as seen by their decision to use the contraceptive pill. Empirical results from multinomial logit provide evidence for this showing that as brideprice, taken as a fraction of total household marriage payment, increases from 0.1 to 0.3 the predicted probability of the mother using the contraceptive pill increases by 8 percentage points.
Subjects: 
marriage market
marriage payments
female bargaining power
contraceptive use
rural Bangladesh
JEL: 
J12
J13
J16
D10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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