Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105376
Authors: 
Kowalewski, Oskar
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Contemporary Economics [ISSN:] 2084-0845 [Publisher:] Vizja Press & IT [Place:] Warsaw [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2012 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 14-44
Abstract: 
This study provides new evidence on the impact of governance on the performance of privately defined contribution pension plans. Using a hand collected data set on governance factors, the study shows that the external and internal governance mechanisms in pension plans are weak. One explanation for this weakness is the potential conflict between the pension beneficiaries and the fund's owner, which depends on who bears the investment risk in the pension plan. Hence, different governance factors are found to be important for pension fund return on invested assets and also for its economic performance. Consequently, the overall policy conclusion is that more focus should be put on the governance of the pension funds, taking into account the different interests of the beneficiaries and owners as it may determine their performance.
Subjects: 
pension funds
corporate governance
agency theory
performance
JEL: 
G23
G28
G30
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article
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