Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105025
Authors: 
Helm, Carsten
Wirl, Franz
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere V-336-11
Abstract: 
We consider how one party can induce another party to join an international emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features: Optimal contracts can include a boundary part, which is not a copy of the no contract outcome. Compared to this, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for inefficient types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing and turn negative, i.e., the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.
Subjects: 
private information
multilateral externalities
mechanism design
restricted contracts
environmental agreements
JEL: 
D82
Q54
H87
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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