Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104994
Authors: 
Bayar, Güzin
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 2014-42 [Pages:] 1-32
Abstract: 
The first step in solving the problem of corruption lies in diagnosing its root causes and determining the underlying factors. One of the most important facilitators of corrupt transactions is intermediaries who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are spurious intermediaries who obtain bribes in connection with public services by pretending to have power over the issue. This deception may be carried out even if the officer providing the public service in question is honest. The simple game theoretical model formulated in this article tries to capture the mechanisms behind such deception. From the solutions of the model, certain policy recommendations to prevent such a process from occurring shall be provided.
Subjects: 
Corruption
spurious middlemen
game theory
JEL: 
K42
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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