Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104605
Authors: 
Benndorf, Volker
Kübler, Dorothea
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 168
Abstract: 
We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can be observed frequently in our data although less often than predicted. Equilibrium play is more likely when subjects are predicted to conceal their productivity than when they should reveal. This tendency of under-revelation, especially of low-productivity workers, is consistent with the level-k model. A loaded frame where the private information concerns the workers' health status leads to less revelation than a neutral frame.
Subjects: 
information revelation
level-k reasoning
privacy
JEL: 
C72
C90
C91
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-167-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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